The public debate about the consequences of Brexit in Britain follows certain predictable lines of established academic concepts in British constitutional law. This arguably overlooks important constitutional complications of Brexit, including the position of Scotland in postBrexit Britain. This article takes the unorthodox approach of focusing on legal and intellectual history rather than British constitutional law, because in this way one obtains a better understanding of the present British constitutional framework in the context of Europe. The discussion is from a continental European viewpoint and through the eyes of a private and commercial lawyer. The completely different understanding of Britain and Europe about the nature of a constitution and the structure of a state becomes more apparent with Britain's departure from the EU, which may also influence the future national cohesion of the UK itself, particularly the relationship between England and Scotland after Brexit.
Introduction
The legal problems which the United Kingdom will have to deal with when leaving the European Union are usually discussed from the perspective of British lawyers, and confined to legal questions of the future trade relationship between the UK and the EU, the situation of EU citizens in the UK, the Irish border, the financial settlement with the EU following Brexit, the legal possibility of reversing the withdrawal under Therefore this article takes an unorthodox approach. It is not about constitutional law as conventionally understood. It rather focuses on legal and intellectual history, comparative law and particularly property theory, and it looks at the British constitution and the challenges Brexit poses from the outside, that is, from a continental European viewpoint and from the position of European intellectual and constitutional history. Furthermore, the perspective taken is primarily not that of a public lawyer, but of a private and commercial lawyer looking at constitutional issues.
In a globalised world of transnational trade and international commercial law the traditional idea of the nation state which the disciplines of public law or constitutional law still adhere to becomes less and less important. Many phenomena of the modern legal world, also within the classical domain of public law, can nowadays only be explained with an analysis of the rules and institutions of commercial law, not traditional public law. In some respects the evolution has come full circle, because the private law or property law element in what we call public law or constitutional law today was central to the feudal system in historical times. And that leads seamlessly to the British constitution and its struggles with Brexit.
Brexit engages commercial lawyers and public lawyers alike. Whether or not the referendum of 23 June 2016 was an accidental slip into popular sovereignty against the age-old constitutional convention of parliamentary sovereignty 1 is unclear.
In any event, the result of the slight majority of 52% of the British people in favour of Britain's departure from the European Union became 'the will of the people' and gospel for parliamentarians. The dictate of the majority already astonished Alexis de
Tocqueville in his study of US democracy: 2 so the minority of 48% were apparently not the 'people', nor even the majority of the Scots and Irish in Northern Ireland who voted against Brexit, 3 and judges upholding parliamentary sovereignty in R. (Miller) v. S of State for Exiting the EU 4 were even the 'enemies of the people' for some. 5 At least at that stage 'the people' became a populist battle cry with fascist leanings. 6 In any event, the UK never really understood the principal idea of the European Union which all EU measures and structures ultimately have to sustain: 7 never ever war between France and Germany and never ever war between Member States generally. Britain had little interest for that. EU membership really meant a pragmatic use of the common market which was considered as expedient. 8 In the UK, overregulation and excessive legal harmonisation were often regarded as objectionable because they may have impeded the free single (financial) market that the UK traditionally championed, or because they may have hurt nationalistic feelings. It was never a British concern that over-synchronization could damage the European project itself: for the more one pursues integration, harmonisation and unification of national laws across Europe, the more one imperils the framework of a union of European states. Further legal unification prompts a tendency of the EU Member States to move away from one another in conflict with the EU agenda, something I called elsewhere the 'Herderian paradox', 9 after Johann Gottfried
Herder's idea of diverse cultural unity of humanity. 10 But the UK never had much comprehension of such ideas. Furthermore, Britain is not a Euro or a Schengen country, so that these issues did not play a great role in the Brexit referendum.
The most important reason for the success of the Brexit supporters in the referendum was not the EU and its possible failings, but 'immigration', or more accurately, the whipping up of xenophobia and racism in the Brexit campaign. The government was quick to adopt this 'immigration' interpretation of the Brexit referendum result. 11 Other possible causes for its outcome, dissatisfaction with the central government in London, the establishment (although parts of that establishment instigated Brexit), or with austerity, have had no decisive importance in the Brexit debate before or after the referendum. In relation to the hostility towards foreigners Britain and many EU countries have become more similar than ever before, curiously at a point in time when Britain wants to leave the EU. An even more sinister aspect of this xenophobia is that it is only ostensibly directed against Europeans, while it may also affect everyone in Britain with a British passport who may not be considered as 26 The EU-Regulation establishing the unitary patent protection through enhanced cooperation 27 is an EU-mantle which gives the non-EU instruments the effect of EU legislation.
The fact that much of the harmonised substantive patent law is technically not EU law may make it possible that the UK could retain some benefits of European patent law. However, the future Unified Patent Court will apply laws that are at least based on EU-Regulations. Therefore referrals to, and reviews by, the Court of Justice (CJEU) of the European Union will be possible and likely. But the UK government seeks to maintain that the UK will no longer be subject to the CJEU's jurisdiction after Brexit. 28 Furthermore, the implementation of the unified patent package presupposes EU membership, 29 even though the substantive patent law is in the EPC and the EU patent court structure is based on the UPC Agreement which are both not EU law. Contrary to the usual political line on Brexit, in December 2016 the UK government expressed the intention to ratify the UPC Agreement, despite its efforts to leave the EU. 30 The British negotiating team will struggle to find a solution to these inconsistencies.
But there is another neglected great problem which the Brexit negotiations highlight: there is a completely different understanding between Britain and Europe about the nature of a constitution and the structure of a state. 31 These, ultimately introduced the possibility that sovereign powers could gradually shift from a monarch or a college of aristocrats to the people. Continental European thinkers were not prepared to follow that conception entirely. Rousseau would postulate the people as the sovereign, but property had no constitution-building role for him, rather the opposite: 51 property was a source of alienation 52 -an idea that inspired Hegel 53 and
Marx whose profoundly influential alienation theory 54 took Hegel's alienation concept into the social and economic sphere.
It is the British Parliament, not the British people which has sovereignty (Ref.
1, p. 109)
. 55 There is no constitutional rule that stipulates the people as the sovereign (something that many modern constitutions would often state at the beginning) 56 which delegates its sovereignty to its parliament by electing it. The opponent of parliamentary sovereignty is the royal prerogative, anachronistic and unacceptable in a modern constitutional system, but alive and well in the British one, although increasingly repressed by Parliament over the centuries. 57 Parliamentary sovereignty cannot be bound by statutes and other legal acts. 58 based on private property fulfil public obligations, but without the accountability and checks and balances a modern constitutional system would provide. It seems that corporate social responsibility measures seek to replicate the constitutional accountability in a democratic and parliamentary system. But that is impossible unless one discards the principles of a company as having separate legal personality, 62 limited liability of shareholders 63 and therefore separation of ownership from power and control, but also from responsibility. 64 It also appears to be that the British feudal constitutional framework from the 'Ancien Régime' could adapt to such postdemocratic phenomena more easily than modern constitutional systems. 65 After the detour via a liberal democracy, it could be a modernised homecoming to a kind of neo-feudalism with emphasis on the proprietary element of beneficium in the feudal relationship, 66 much in a Brexit-spirit of reverting to ancient British tradition.
British pragmatism, as well as the difficulty to invade the British isles and colonise them in the wake of such military intervention with more recent political ideas (as happened in Germany and Italy as a consequence of the Napoleonic wars), may have helped preserving the British feudal constitutional framework. And something else was also crucial for its continued existence: its opaqueness and flexibility. One can read into the British system what one wants to and interpret it in a great number of ways without the need for a change of the legal status quo. Thus the system can be invoked for feudal absolutism as in the 17 th century (where it originated from), or for a paternalistic conservative welfare state; it can be reconciled with a liberal and perhaps democratic laisser faire society, and it could also be customised to modern authoritarian forms of government. As long as the position of the crown and the feudal structure are not touched (the modern social adaptation is particularly the class system which defines itself considerably through property ownership), much greater political and social flexibility and scope for new design is possible than under a legal system with a written constitution. 'It might be assumed that the world orders of Jacobean England and the United Kingdom entering the twenty-first century are totally different. Divine right is not invoked to justify the powers of the Crown and yet most of the powers of the Crown still exist to be exercised by the Crown as it sees fit. … We may find it difficult to establish what the royal prerogative meant in the past: we have to interpret the powers of the prerogative within the context of the political arrangements of the day. We know that the royal prerogative exists today, but how far do the old authorities from a bygone era serve as a useful guide to the present day powers of the Crown?' However, there is no compelling constitutional reason to assume that this view has to be adopted again, in 2017, 72 particularly by the present government that wants to restore British (more precisely: English) values and traditions from perhaps the 1950s, or from Victorian times or even earlier -the recreation of a romanticised traditional
Britain of the past is necessarily a pastiche of inconsistencies and anachronisms. But the royal prerogative is certainly a part of British constitutional tradition and fits well if one wants it to fit, and the 'context of the political arrangements of the day'
undoubtedly permits a widening of the scope of the prerogative of the Crown.
Recently, the prime minister took the view that notification under article 50 of the Treaty of the European Union to start withdrawal from the EU is fully within the powers of government by virtue of the Crown's prerogative powers to enter into and withdraw from treaties, so that Parliament need not be involved. 73 This opinion could only have puzzled European constitutional lawyers not familiar with the feudal root of the British constitutional system. Some, not all, 74 British constitutional lawyers considered the government's position as legally acceptable, but found it politically unwise. 75 In The Supreme Court, however, remarked that, although the prerogative powers have been described as a 'relic of a past age', 'that description should not be understood as implying that the royal prerogative is either anomalous or anachronistic'. 77 From the viewpoint of a modern constitutional system it is probably both, 78 and the fact that private persons with the necessary financial means had to 86 Idiosyncratic all that may be, charming it is certainly not. Apart from the fact that only those members of the class regarded as born to rule can allow themselves to indulge in eccentricities (a point Europeans frequently fail to realise), these eccentricities can usher in outright authoritarian and non-democratic measures which are perfectly compatible with the British constitutional system, since almost everything is compatible with this system, except, perhaps, radical forms of socialism.
It is a strange paradox that the EU, which effectively limited British parliamentary sovereignty, 87 acted as a kind of framework, or others would say, as a corset, that helped the ancient British constitutional system emulating a modern democratic state and ensured that the British constitution is continued to be interpreted in the light of a modern liberal and pluralist parliamentary democracy. This is puzzling in two ways: First, it is not a constitution that enacts -from a lawyer's perspective -the legal structures of a democratic system, but it is rather political consensus from time to time that moulds the British constitutional system from the 'Ancien Régime' into a modern democracy. Secondly, the EU itself has a number of democratic deficits 88 and is not an impeccable role model for democracies. 90 which underlines their mutual political sympathies. The fact that the UK was a democracy when it joined the EU does not mean that it will remain a modern highly developed democracy after it has left it. In the absence of a formal constitution the common law is not an adequate safeguard either.
c) The common law as the ultimate source of law In Britain the ultimate source of law, including for the courts, is not a constitution, but a mystical idea of the 'common law'. This also applies to the courts deciding on it is again the courts in their decisions which find, or ascertain, the extent of that sovereignty, 93 for example where there is a conflict with the royal prerogative. So we are back to a constitutional and general customary law, the 'common law' as the mystical source of all law. And this 'common law' as an ideal seems to have a special fascination for many, like the conservative philosopher Roger Scruton: 94 'I was absolutely bowled over by the English law. I had no idea of its historical depth and the fact that it captured in beautiful concepts a vision of what it is to be at home for a thousand years in a single place which is what our country has experienced. And the common law is a wonderful expression of this because it is a law which has never been imposed from above, it has grown from the decisions of the courts, grown from concrete cases in which real human conflicts of all kinds have been resolved by impartial judges … without there necessarily being a statute … And this way of reasoning from the particular case to the principle, rather than from the abstract structure of the constitution down to the particular case, is, in my view, not just intellectually, but also morally, completely superior to the other way of doing it. … And it's at the root of a deep … structural antagonism between Common law countries and these Roman law countries, Civilian, as they are called, such as the French and the German.'
This romantic view is at odds with the history of English law, but rather common and representative, also among English lawyers. The statement stresses at least three points:
First, English law is supposedly the law for self-proclaimed English people, not for people having arrived from elsewhere during the centuries, such as non-white people, but also Europeans. Apparently, English law is not compatible with Scots law either which has a Civilian origin to some extent, so that Scottish people and English law would be a problematic match, too. Behind this statement stands the feudal idea that an individual's personal status determines the law that applies to him, such as different marriage laws or laws of succession for the nobility, the common people, foreigners, Jews and so forth, as was the case well into the nineteenth century in Europe. However, despite that historical reality, some comparative lawyers conjure up the idea of a more or less uniform concept of a Roman law-based ius commune
Europaeum that apparently existed in Europe in the sixteenth century already. In this way they try to justifiy attempts at a Europe-wide unification of private law today, 95 an endeavour that initiates the 'Herderian paradox' explained above. Several specialists in German legal history have shown that the approach of these 'ius commune seekers' is historically incorrect because there was rather a patchwork of different laws applying simultaneously according to class and status, feudal tenure, origin, religion, territory and so forth. 96 One may be reminded that the Austrian Civil Code, promulgated in 1811 and still in force with many amendments, is entitled 'General Civil Code' (Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch), 97 and 'general' emphasised the then new fact 98 that the civil code was supposed to apply to all classes of society. 99 So in theory one could bring a civil law action for damages even against the Emperor, although that most likely never happened.
The idea of English law for the English (British) and some other law for the others was reflected in the usual situation in much of the British Empire. For instance, in India under British colonial rule that was often the legal reality, in form of a divergent application of the law (usually imported English law) to the British and to the Indians. 100 In Africa under British colonial rule the British authorities frequently used and shaped local customary laws for, and supposedly from, the indigenous population. These laws were exploited in the context of the 'indirect rule' to serve the interests of the colonial powers, while the British were subjected to their own law. 101 The existing constitutional framework does not expressly stand against a special regime in a post-Brexit Britain for the Scots, Welsh and Irish or any other group one may seek to define. The term 'federalism' is unpopular in the UK, 104 not only because it may remind too much of the 'enemy' in culture, the USA, and the former enemy in war, Germany, but also because a true federal system is incompatible with the British feudal constitutional framework outlined before: a federal system would not allow the What is not appreciated satisfactorily, also among British constitutional scholars, is the fact that an ultimately feudal constitutional system that is still the design and framework of the state can only be a system of centralism. 107 Where historically the princes and later the regions had too much power which went towards independent sovereignty, then the state fell apart, as in Germany, finally after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648; 108 where this regional power was curbed, the state preserved itself as a centralised entity, as in France under Louis XIII and Louis XIV. 109 Thus Britain could afford the luxury to establish this partial and incomplete system of federalism for Scotland because it has been a member of the EU where the position of being a sovereign nation state is less relevant: a Member State is embedded in a supranational legal and political framework. Once Britain is on its own after Brexit, the assertion of its national unity and integrity will become much more and such an argument presumably carries much less weight with a British government (or Parliament) that prepares for Brexit.
b)
Constitutional Solutions: Federalism -Centralism -Independence The cleanest solution after Brexit would be a written federal constitution as the ultimate source of law which creates and empowers a national parliament and regional parliaments separately and determines their legislative competencies, with a recourse to a (separate) constitutional court in cases of conflicts of competence. In this way the Scottish Parliament and Government would be established by, and based on, the constitution, not on the parliamentary sovereignty of the British Parliament.
Where the authority to enact such a constitution shall come from, is an interesting point, but goes beyond this discussion (Ref. 1, p. 229). constitution is as important as its content.' 119 It was not more than an initial discussion paper; nothing was suitable for enactment and enforcement in case of independence.
The most obvious reason for the reticence of the SNP government in relation to a Scottish constitution is that, again, there does not seem to be sufficient appreciation for the concept of a constitution in a modern sense: Scots were also socialised under the traditional feudal British constitution that can, and currently does, assume democratic forms. But, as said, it cannot cope with, and is not associated with, modern federal structures. 120 So the idea of preparing and passing a regional state constitution for Scotland in any event, irrespective of whether and when independence will follow at a later date has apparently not crossed the minds of Scottish politicians. In fact, in federal states like Germany or Austria their states or
Länder obviously have separate state constitutions. However, state law must not contradict the national laws or the constitution of the federation (Bund). 121 For
Scotland the enactment of a Scottish constitution can be more challenging because it is more difficult to ascertain if and when the Scottish constitution conflicts with the unwritten British constitution. It is also hard to establish a competence to pass such a constitution, because under the Scotland Act 1998 constitutional issues are a reserved matter. 122 Nevertheless, it would be advisable to explore ways to enact a regional constitution in Scotland which could serve, at least in the interim, as a national constitution in the case of later independence. Some existing constitutional examples, and even some solutions in history could provide some inspiration, such as the Compromise (Ausgleich) between Austria and Hungary. That Compromise created a real union (not a federation 123 ) between Austria and Hungary and established the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1867. 124 Whether or not there will be a further Scottish independence referendum -which may also be advisory as the Brexit referendum and the independence referendum of 2014 were 125 -there could be a constitutional crisis, especially if a referendum held were to result in favour of independence. This would not be a good time to cobble together a constitutional framework for a possible new state, and the general lack of expertise in drafting matters would only exacerbate that situation. Furthermore, a referendum question, such as, 'Should Scotland be an independent country?', 126 only makes sense to a lawyer if there is a (draft) constitution in place which would create this independent country, otherwise 'Scotland' remains an irrational romantic notion.
In cases of state secession, constitutional crises and even the breach of the national constitution are the norm, unless an existing constitution has a procedure for the secession of a region. 127 Catalonia underlines that. 134 For an independent Scotland, however, the political circumstances for joining the EU after Brexit might be more favourable than in 2014.
The economic problems as a result of leaving the EU are for others to discuss. In the independence campaign the SNP government also suggested a currency union with England ('the sterling zone') after Scottish independence 135 
c) Relinquishing Scottish legal nationalism
A final point concerns the future of Scots law, whatever the position of Scotland will be: a state in a further developed British constitutional federation or an independent country. In either case Scotland will retain its separate legal system, as preserved in the Act of Union in 1706. 138 The rising Scottish legal nationalism from the 1960s onwards, mostly among Scottish legal academics, far less so among practitioners, wanted to safeguard Scots law against the perceived intrusions of English law and to determine a dissimilarity of Scots law as a partly Roman-law based mixed system between civil and common law in contrast to the unadulterated common law of England. 139 This mission ought to be abandoned for several reasons.
There are many flaws in the approach of Scottish legal nationalism, starting with the crude application of the concept of a mixed legal system and the problem that some areas of Scots private law are not really mixed because they are essentially common law (contract, delict) or Roman law-based civil law (property Scotland stays in the UK, any protectionist antiquarian hair-splitting by specialists, like the example of the abstract conveyance above, also ought to be discarded. Otherwise Scotland will not be able to establish itself as a small jurisdiction with laws which are recognised as a modern separate body of law in the UK and in the world.
Scottish legal academics have a responsibility not to frustrate the development of Scots law with recherché themes as a battleground for out-dated nationalistic polemics couched in legal scholarship.
Conclusion
These discussions should not give the impression that a written constitution, either for 150 Britain has no equivalent, except a modern benevolent interpretation of a malleable constitutional framework consisting of changeable customary law, some statutes and case law. The British constitutional system can be adapted easily to political developments that would now be considered as a retrograde step. In the EU Britain emulated modern democracies; whether it will do that outside the EU remains to be seen.
Political theory and political history have shown in many examples that it is a fatal error to believe in the benevolence of the executive in a state. The 'way of reasoning from the particular case to the principle, rather than from the abstract structure of the constitution down to the particular case' is not 'completely superior' '… no man is bound to obey the king's commands, unless delivered in a certain form prescribed by law. … The laws are superior to the king, and these he must be judged by. And supposing an absolute government in the strictest sense, where the king's will is law, yet there is always one law above him, which is that of self-preservation.'
If Scotland does choose to become independent, that should be a longer process, well- 16 As the former permanent representative of the UK to the EU, Sir Ivan Rogers, said in his resignation letter of 3 Jan. 2017: 'Serious multilateral negotiating experience is in short supply in Whitehall, and that is not the case in the Commission or in the Council.', available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-38503504 (accessed 17 Jan. 2018). 
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